[cssm] [EXTERNAL] Re: SACP: configuration of tranfer services
Shames, Peter M (US 312B)
peter.m.shames at jpl.nasa.gov
Mon Mar 1 21:55:59 UTC 2021
Guys,
I tend to be a “listener” in these discussions, but having this very timely topic of cybersecurity be addressed is something that merits further discussion. I have also looped in Howie Weiss, SEA SecWG Chair, trusting that he will bring in other WG members if needed.
I will state that I am a strong believer in “belt and suspenders” where cybersecurity is an issue. And I will state my belief that securing the command uplink, in particular, is the single most impactful thing we can do fat the cross support level. We get somewhat different perspectives on this is we look at it from different points of view:
1. End to end: delivery of commands from command load generation on the ground to command load delivery on board, possibly including end-to-end encryption of the command data itself
2. Command cross support: delivery of commands from the mission MOC to the ESLT forward service (F-CLTU or FF-CSTS), possibly including network/transport security and user/port/system authentication
3. Command transmission: delivery of commands from the ELST to the spacecraft over the RF link, possibly including link layer encryption (SDLS) and/or network layer encryption if IP or DTN are used
4. Similar considerations must enter in for all SLE and CSTS cross support interfaces and also for the whole family of SM interfaces and services, which are related to item 2) in this list.
There are a variety of security mechanisms identified. I used the word “encryption”, but acknowledge that this might involve authentication, encryption, or authenticated encryption. It is entirely likely that only one or two will be used in any given deployment and the choice is up to the mission / spacecraft teams and the ESLT service provider.
My “what occurs on the ground info may be out of date, but last I knew most of these features were not in use for the wide array of CCSDS / civilian missions. Based on recent NASA mandates (and presumably other agencies are doing likewise, or already have) some of this is changing even as we speak. The whole reason that I am bringing this up is that any focus on “pass specific SICF credentials” seems to be way too narrow a focus for any meaningful discussion of how to counter cybersecurity threats.
Given this array of possible approaches, is there some viable subset that CCSDS (CSS and SEA) are willing to support as “recommended” for use by civilian, robotic, space missions? Perhaps a focused meeting on this, with SEA Sec WG more broadly involved, is called for?
Cheers, Peter
From: SMWG <smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org> on behalf of Anthony Crowson <anthony.crowson at telespazio.de>
Date: Monday, March 1, 2021 at 6:31 AM
To: Erik Barkley <erik.j.barkley at jpl.nasa.gov>, "EXTERNAL-Unal, Martin P (9110-Affiliate)" <Martin.Unal at esa.int>
Cc: SMWG <smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org>, SMWG <smwg at mailman.ccsds.org>
Subject: Re: [cssm] [EXTERNAL] Re: SACP: configuration of tranfer services
At the risk of wading in to a sensitive area, it seems to me that the expected advantage of a pass specific SICF over a permanent SICF is pass-specific credentials. If the credentials are accidentally exposed, there is a much smaller window in which they could be misused.
However, having even one pass hijacked could in the worst case lead to loss of a mission.
If I’m already wrong at this state, please correct me gently and ignore the rest…
There is an, admittedly imperfect, analogy to the prevalent but outdated practice of insisting that passwords are changed every few months. If a password is exposed to a malicious actor, it will almost certainly be used before a change is forced. Approaches such as two-factor authentication are much more useful.
Now the SLE IP, as far as I understand, does not do any encryption – rather, it expects that the network connection would if necessary be tunnelled through a secure communications channel. If this is not done, then even per-pass credentials will not protect against a man-in-the-middle attack. On the other hand, if strong authentication is provided by a secure communications channel, completely independently of SLE itself, then the SLE credentials become vastly less critical – more at the level of a protection against misconfiguration than against serious attacks.
So yes, in the absence of other measures, a pass-specific SICF can provide a modest security improvement by limiting credential lifetime. However, it is not by itself an adequate protection against modern cybersecurity threats. If adequate protection is provided by other means, it is not clear that the pass-specific SICF adds significant value. In other words, the more productive focus would be on protecting and authenticating the underlying connection.
Anthony
From: Barkley, Erik J (US 3970) <erik.j.barkley at jpl.nasa.gov>
Sent: 16 February 2021 17:02
To: EXTERNAL-Unal, Martin P (9110-Affiliate) <Martin.Unal at esa.int>
Cc: SMWG <smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org>; Anthony Crowson <anthony.crowson at telespazio.de>; smwg at mailman.ccsds.org
Subject: RE: [cssm] [EXTERNAL] Re: SACP: configuration of tranfer services
Martin,
You indicate that pass specific SICF is not “a serious answer” re today’s cybersecurity threats. I fail to see how a permanent SICF is a serious answer. Do you have any suggestions?
Best regards,
-Erik
From: SMWG <smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org>> On Behalf Of Martin.Unal at esa.int<mailto:Martin.Unal at esa.int>
Sent: Monday, February 15, 2021 7:26
To: Barkley, Erik J (US 3970) <erik.j.barkley at jpl.nasa.gov<mailto:erik.j.barkley at jpl.nasa.gov>>
Cc: SMWG <smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org>>; Anthony Crowson <anthony.crowson at telespazio.de<mailto:anthony.crowson at telespazio.de>>; smwg at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg at mailman.ccsds.org>
Subject: Re: [cssm] [EXTERNAL] Re: SACP: configuration of tranfer services
Hello
This was discussed in length with Wolfgang Hell at the time we discontinued pass specific SICF.
In term of security, the added value of pass specific SICF is close to nil.
In term of operational failure, the handling of pass specific was causing lose of service on a monthly basis.
And the recovery action was to use permanent SICF. So what the point.
I have experienced the usage of pass specific SICF, and I can insure you this is not something you want to see in human spaceflight operation.
Cyber security has to be taken seriously.
Pass specific SICF is not a serious answer to today threat.
Regards
________________________________________
Martin UNAL
Ground Operation Manager
Ground Facilities Ops HSO - ONO
H-376
ESOC
Robert-Bosch Strasse 5
64 293 Darmstadt
Germany
Tel +49 6151 90 2959
________________________________________
From: "Barkley, Erik J\(US 3970\) via SMWG" <smwg at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg at mailman.ccsds.org>>
To: "Holger.Dreihahn at esa.int<mailto:Holger.Dreihahn at esa.int>" <Holger.Dreihahn at esa.int<mailto:Holger.Dreihahn at esa.int>>, "Marcin.Gnat at dlr.de<mailto:Marcin.Gnat at dlr.de>" <Marcin.Gnat at dlr.de<mailto:Marcin.Gnat at dlr.de>>
Cc: "SMWG" <smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org>>, "Anthony Crowson" <anthony.crowson at telespazio.de<mailto:anthony.crowson at telespazio.de>>, "smwg at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg at mailman.ccsds.org>" <smwg at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg at mailman.ccsds.org>>
Date: 15/02/2021 15:52
Subject: Re: [cssm] [EXTERNAL] Re: SACP: configuration of tranfer services
Sent by: "SMWG" <smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org>>
________________________________
Just to add a quick comments to this thread, the DSN also employs permanent SICFs for SLE instance configurations. Much like what Colin has indicated the implementers complained that it was just too much trouble to deal with dynamic SICFs as that would involve more testing and more things could go wrong, etc. However given the changing cyber security landscape I would ask if, eventually, can you afford not to have dynamically generated SICFs or some other equivalent such that access is very much controlled on a tracking pass by tracking pass basis – especially if you are supporting human spaceflight? I think it is something we should keep an eye on.
Best regards,
-Erik
From: SMWG <smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org>> On Behalf Of Holger.Dreihahn at esa.int<mailto:Holger.Dreihahn at esa.int>
Sent: Wednesday, February 10, 2021 23:45
To: Marcin.Gnat at dlr.de<mailto:Marcin.Gnat at dlr.de>
Cc: SMWG <smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org>>; smwg at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg at mailman.ccsds.org>; Anthony Crowson <anthony.crowson at telespazio.de<mailto:anthony.crowson at telespazio.de>>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [cssm] SACP: configuration of tranfer services
Hi Marcin,
I remember having implemented SLE SICF generation for our scheduling system (2008?) and I think we have put some thinking in how to do that. As Colin correctly remarks, the feature of pass specific SICFs is not used - simply too many files.
However, the trick at the time was to distribute the information for SLE SICF creation to the two relevant places: The mission agreement with the (SLE) service requirements and the ground station model with the ground station capabilities (amongothers the SLE services supported formulated as templates). The two are used for determine 'does the station have the required capabilities' and then to combine the information as shown below to the configuration (slide 45 of attachment):
[cid:image001.jpg at 01D70EA2.9B566420]
Some background: Our scheduling is service based, so in addition to the SLE services we define the underlying production services as operational services (TM, TC, DDOR, Ranging, etc.), which are required (mission agreement) and matched with station capabilities (station model). Those production services are in fact subject to configuration profiles, which can be refined by missions per pass or requested service.
In orinciple the complete configuration profiles could be defined by FRM parameters.
I know it's not exactly what you discuss, but maybe of some interest.
Best regards,
Holger
Holger Dreihahn
European Spacecraft Operations Centre | European Space Agency | H-293
+49 6151 90 2233 | http://www.esa.int/esoc<https://urldefense.us/v3/__http:/www.esa.int/esoc__;!!PvBDto6Hs4WbVuu7!cUFMLvyNBxsXjIEqxu_xPyOODmdz7sNc8DmT2jFOhzJdaKN8-vi73Ny7pJZjU4K_DJAqVlE$>
From: Colin.Haddow at esa.int<mailto:Colin.Haddow at esa.int>
To: "Anthony Crowson" <anthony.crowson at telespazio.de<mailto:anthony.crowson at telespazio.de>>
Cc: "SMWG" <smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org>>, "smwg at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg at mailman.ccsds.org>" <smwg at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg at mailman.ccsds.org>>
Date: 10/02/2021 18:46
Subject: Re: [cssm] SACP: configuration of tranfer services
Sent by: "SMWG" <smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org>>
________________________________
Hi Marcin, Anthony,
ESOC has effectivly moved to permanent SICfs. The NIS (Neywork Interface System - Handles MCS - Groundstation SLE links) was designed to be able to use dynamic as well as permanent SICFs and the missions screamed about the prospect of having to use dynamic ones, much preferring to use permanent ones.
Cheers for now,
Colin
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Colin R. Haddow,
HSO-GI, European Space Agency,
European Space Operations Centre,
Robert-Bosch-Str 5,
64293 Darmstadt,
Germany.
Phone; +49 6151 90 2896
Fax; +49 6151 90 3010
E-Mail; colin.haddow at esa.int<mailto:colin.haddow at esa.int>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Anthony Crowson" <anthony.crowson at telespazio.de<mailto:anthony.crowson at telespazio.de>>
To: "Marcin.Gnat at dlr.de<mailto:Marcin.Gnat at dlr.de>" <Marcin.Gnat at dlr.de<mailto:Marcin.Gnat at dlr.de>>, "smwg at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg at mailman.ccsds.org>" <smwg at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg at mailman.ccsds.org>>
Date: 10/02/2021 18:23
Subject: Re: [cssm] SACP: configuration of tranfer services
Sent by: "SMWG" <smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org>>
________________________________
Hi Marcin,
As I would see it, and as I think we had it in the old Blue-1 book, the service instance identifiers and the parameters you feel are missing are part of the service package, not the SA or CP. Your 3 spacecraft configurations would be 3 configuration profiles. The SP request may identify a specific station or antenna; at any rate, the SP itself will identify the aperture and the service instances, and at least port IDs.
There was a discussion which I don’t think was ever fully resolved, about service instance identifiers. The original concept had them being dynamically defined for each service package. But the “stop-gap” SICF approach ended up with people getting used to “permanent” SI IDs and being reluctant to change that. Certainly I think it would be unhelpful to have to reproduce the same config multiple times just to use different SI IDs for different apertures.
Basically what you suggest in your second and third bullets looks about right, modulo discussion on permanence of SI IDs.
I think the FRM parameters identified as just “reporting” mean they cannot be changed during production. Clearly they have to be set somewhere, i.e. “by management”, as part of setting up the service packages.
Anthony
From: SMWG <smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org>> On Behalf Of Marcin.Gnat at dlr.de<mailto:Marcin.Gnat at dlr.de>
Sent: 26 January 2021 15:32
To: smwg at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:smwg at mailman.ccsds.org>
Subject: [cssm] SACP: configuration of tranfer services
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Dear SMWG,
In course of some implementation work and discussion with my developers, I came to the point where I think we shall have some closer discussion soon (in one of our teleconferences and definitely later during spring meetings).
The protagonist: configuration (profile) of the transfer service (known currently under nicknames “SLE configuration” or “SICF”).
The place and time: somewhere in snowy Bavaria during Winter 2020/2021, Corona situation.
The Synopsis: during implementation of VEEEEEERY remotely similar profiles into DLR’s new scheduling system, my developers asked me how they shall treat the Service Instance Identifiers in the profile. When I looked at their initial implementation, I noticed, that they did put the complete configuration (service) profile in “one piece”, according to the current list from FRM and to what I told them. It does not correspond to the full flexibility of the actual planned SACP (this was not the intention). Anyhow, I realized two things:
1. Not all of SLE parameters were there (GVCID, Port and User identifiers, etc…)
2. Defined as such now, projects would need to define multiple configuration profiles, being actually the same, differing only with Service Instance Identifier, for each Service Instance. In our case, for example for TerraSAR mission, we have actual 3 spacecraft configurations for the antenna, but in total 32 service instances for different stations, antennas and cortexes. This maybe does not multiply 1x1, but at least we would need 32 configuration profiles (I can almost hear the project people coming to get me)!
Okay, this is to some extent my own fault, as I burdened the implementation of “some kind of configuration profile” to my developers, and maybe did not thought about it in front. But it shows I think also some shortcomings we have with the concept (maybe it will shape up still).
To the first point, I quickly noticed, that – even I made a list of parameters based on FRM – actually not all parameters are really exposed. When looking to the export of Holger out of FRM and the schema files, I noticed than there is number of parameters which are marked only as “reporting” thus in first place not visible to SACP (hence my omission). And so, all Initiator and Responder Id’s as well as PortId’s and the GVCID’s are marked as “reporting” or “read-only” if you like. How are we going to set them? Shouldn’t they be also configurable, similar like Service Instance ID?
From this:
[cid:image002.png at 01D70EA2.9B566420]
To this:
[cid:image003.png at 01D70EA2.9B566420]
Second topic is the actual (operational) separation of the antenna configuration and the transfer services configuration. Currently (at least at DLR) this looks like this:
[cid:image004.png at 01D70EA2.9B566420]
There are few antenna configurations (which may be effectively also identical throughout different antennas) and number of SLE configurations (Service Instances). To be fully honest, the multiplication of the SLE config is just due to the different Responder ID and Port ID’s, resulting also in separate Service Instance ID, the rest of the config is typically the same (for a specific RCF or FCLTU service).
How do we want to handle that with our current concept of SACP?
I know we had some brief discussions on that, and there is some three page (chapter 3.4.2) information on intended use in the TechNote of John. It speaks relatively high level about two options, reusing SICF files (kind of an extension to the actual SACP config) and also by dynamically setting the abovementioned parameters.
First option says, that SICF files shall be there, and the Responder and Provider ID’s and Ports shall be fixed in Service Agreement and for specific Site and Mission, and later on only these shall be used. It does not actually however says anything on how actual SICF is bound to the specific Service Package nor Service Package Request nor Configuration Profile. We have Ports and their ID’s, but how do I know which SICF shall I use? Shall there be also predefined ONE fixed SICF?
Second option of using the extended/abstract parameters in Service Package may allow for dynamic provision of the so called “scheduledSocket” which would be just the ProviderPort. So far so good, but still I miss the rest of the SLE/CSTS configuration, especially wrt to what I wrote above.
Here is where the I lost the trace of the hunted game. And maybe we need here some discussion. ?
I was thinking – just to came into with some proposal – of the following (better ideas are welcome!):
- To not destroy everything else we already somehow managed to set up wrt SMURF, SPDF and SACP…
- …We could use extended list (as at the beginning) in the Service profile, with Service Instance ID, PortID’s, GVCID’s etc., having predefined some parameters (i.e. Buffer sizes), whereas leaving all of these “variable ones” undefined. That way we would have limited number of Configuration Profiles (a set of few generic ones for the spacecraft, universally engageable in every station).
- When booking the Service Package (sending the Request) we could “overwrite” the previously mentioned parameters using AbstractParameter Class (for example “InitiatiorID” and “ServiceInstanceID” and “GVCID”). The same would be true for SPDF – the values there would be shown in AbstractParameter class (and for example additionally station defined PortID would be provided). This would allow to use all of our Books / Formates as they are, and have individual SLE configuration for each pass/service package.
- The disadvantage of the above method would be, that there would need to be some kind of automated generation of Service Instance ID and GVCID on user side and the ProviderPort on provider side. Otherwise we come into danger of crazy users/providers not filling these parameters, or filling them wrongly or even filling them different.
Okay… I’m done for today ?
Cheers
Marcin_______________________________________________
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