[Sis-dtn] [EXT] Re: SIS-DTN BPsec Profile

Wed Nov 23 13:30:11 UTC 2022

Yes, sure.

It's just that for standardisation we may want to limit the options to allow better interoperability. With the CRCs any intermediate node can check integrity even if they don't implement any BPSEC (which they would not require per CCSDS BB). So, the question for me is whether we have any 'likely' use cases or not. I certainly think that it is good to have this option in IETF BPSEC, the question is more what is really needed for CCSDS BPSEC. Maybe for BPSEC integrity + authentication is sufficient . Anyway, I could live with either decision.

Regards,
Felix

From: Birrane, Edward J. <Edward.Birrane at jhuapl.edu>
Sent: 23 November 2022 14:12
To: Felix Flentge <Felix.Flentge at esa.int>; sburleig.sb at gmail.com; 'Dr. Keith L Scott' <kscott at mitre.org>; sea-sec at mailman.ccsds.org; sis-dtn at mailman.ccsds.org
Cc: 'Peter Shames' <peter.shames at jpl.nasa.gov>
Subject: RE: [EXT] Re: [Sis-dtn] SIS-DTN BPsec Profile

BPv7 supports 2 CRC algorithms. There are many other integrity algorithms and if you want to use others, a BPSec BIB can be used for integrity only.

-Ed

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(www.blackberry.com<http://www.blackberry.com>)

From: SIS-DTN <sis-dtn-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:sis-dtn-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org>> on behalf of: Felix Flentge via SIS-DTN <sis-dtn at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:sis-dtn at mailman.ccsds.org>>
Date: Wednesday, Nov 23, 2022 at 2:34 AM
To: sburleig.sb at gmail.com<mailto:sburleig.sb at gmail.com> <sburleig.sb at gmail.com<mailto:sburleig.sb at gmail.com>>, 'Dr. Keith L Scott' <kscott at mitre.org<mailto:kscott at mitre.org>>, sea-sec at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:sea-sec at mailman.ccsds.org> <sea-sec at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:sea-sec at mailman.ccsds.org>>, sis-dtn at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:sis-dtn at mailman.ccsds.org> <sis-dtn at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:sis-dtn at mailman.ccsds.org>>
Cc: 'Peter Shames' <peter.shames at jpl.nasa.gov<mailto:peter.shames at jpl.nasa.gov>>
Subject: [EXT] Re: [Sis-dtn] SIS-DTN BPsec Profile

Hi,

BPv7 alone (without BPSEC) can already provide integrity with the (optional) block CRCs. I guess this could be sufficient for Pluto Express.

Now, whether we need integrity without authenticity in BPSEC, I am not sure.

Regards,
Felix

From: SIS-DTN <sis-dtn-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:sis-dtn-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org>> On Behalf Of sburleig.sb--- via SIS-DTN
Sent: 22 November 2022 20:33
To: 'Dr. Keith L Scott' <kscott at mitre.org<mailto:kscott at mitre.org>>; sis-dtn at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:sis-dtn at mailman.ccsds.org>; sea-sec at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:sea-sec at mailman.ccsds.org>
Cc: 'Peter Shames' <peter.shames at jpl.nasa.gov<mailto:peter.shames at jpl.nasa.gov>>
Subject: Re: [Sis-dtn] SIS-DTN BPsec Profile

My sense of integrity vs authority, which may well be wildly wrong, is that integrity can be provided by a checksum or CRC or by a signature computed in a symmetric key that everybody knows, but authority can only be provided by a signature computed in the sender's private key (verified in the sender's known public key).  I strongly suspect it's not that simple, though.

Scott

From: SIS-DTN <sis-dtn-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org<mailto:sis-dtn-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org>> On Behalf Of Dr. Keith L Scott via SIS-DTN
Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2022 11:04 AM
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Cc: Peter Shames <peter.shames at jpl.nasa.gov<mailto:peter.shames at jpl.nasa.gov>>
Subject: [Sis-dtn] SIS-DTN BPsec Profile

Greetings,

We have a joint meeting scheduled on Friday Dec 2.  This is nominally one of the monthly meetings to discuss the new BPsec Green Book, but I'd like to propose taking the December 2 meeting to discuss the BPsec Blue Book Profile.

I had a discussion w/ Howie the other day that resulted in a number of changes to the document:

Authenticity
Antonias had several comments around authenticity and whether or not it made any sense to provide integrity without authenticity.  I could envision a mission that wanted to provide data integrity on the science data it was returning, but might not need/want to provide authenticity.  The assumption here would be (I suppose) that it wouldn't make sense for anyone to fake the data (e.g. a faked image purportedly from Pluto Express showing a sign on the surface "I want to be a planet again."?)

That said, it seems like the services missions might want to choose from / implement are:

  *   Integrity
  *   Authenticity
  *   Confidentiality

[I'll admit to being a bit confused by this; MY model for authenticity would be to use some sort of signed hash on the primary bundle block (which includes the source EID), though I suppose other mechanisms are possible].

In the document I tried to use "authenticity / integrity" where appropriate, and to otherwise mention authenticity where I thought it was appropriate.  I'd be interested if folks think I got close to right.

I still need to add some text around the 'pick-list' notion of integrity / authenticity / confidentiality above.

Security Contexts
I added some text about security contexts and moved other text around so that security contexts now show up earlier than they used to.

Default Security Contexts
RFC9173 contains a set of default security contexts for BPsec:

  *   Integrity Security Context BIB-HMAC-SHA2
  *   Security Context BCB-AES-GCM

I think the questions I'd like to get at at next week's telecon is:

  *   Do we need a set of default security contexts for the CCSDS Profile of BPsec?

     *   I think so.  Maybe not even mandatory to implement but at least a defined set that can be used for testing?

  *   If the answer to the above is in fact 'yes' - what should we use for the default profiles?  The current book has (I think) essentially RCC9172 pulled in, but then it looks like somebody (apologies, the changes are only marked as 'Author') seems to have suggested changing some of the recommended key sizes.
So, if we could at least start talking about a nominal set of security contexts for the profile I think that would get us a LOT further down the road to getting the book out.

                                v/r,

                                --keith
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