[Sis-dtn] Proposed registry (and registry changes) to address BP operations in CCSDS.

Sheehe, Charles J. (GRC-LCN0) charles.j.sheehe at nasa.gov
Tue Aug 28 13:32:42 UTC 2018


Hi
IMHO

I think there should be an additional, registry / activity / service.  Authentication Credentials should be managed by SANA.

The standard is being developed by the security working group and the SANA's structure works well with how a CCSDS X.509.V3 certificate is built.  

Thanks
Chuck

Charles J. Sheehe III
Computer Engineer
Glenn Research Center
21000 Brookpark Rd
Cleveland, OH 44135
Charles.J.Sheehe at NASA.GOV
Office: 216-433-5179

“Omnia vero”
The happiness of your life depends upon the quality of your thoughts. Marcus Aurelius



-----Original Message-----
From: SIS-DTN <sis-dtn-bounces at mailman.ccsds.org> On Behalf Of Scott, Keith L.
Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2018 8:39 AM
To: sis-dtn at mailman.ccsds.org
Cc: Shames, Peter M (JPL-312B)[Jet Propulsion Laboratory] <peter.m.shames at jpl.nasa.gov>; Burleigh, Scott C (JPL-312B)[Jet Propulsion Laboratory] <scott.c.burleigh at jpl.nasa.gov>; SANA Group <ssg at mailman.ccsds.org>
Subject: [Sis-dtn] Proposed registry (and registry changes) to address BP operations in CCSDS.

Greetings,

 

Peter Shames noted that while there are registries for SANA CBHE Node and Service numbers that will allow us to deconflict node EIDs and have a uniform interpretation of the service numbers, there is nothing that says WHICH services are running at WHICH node, OR anything that associates BP Nodes (in our case identified by CBHE Node IDs) and the services they’re running with ‘Sites’ (using the Service and Site Aperture Registry definition) such as ground stations, spacecraft, etc.  This kind of information, while not technically required to make BP work, is part of the administration/operation of the network, and would be expected to change infrequently (and so at least feasible to maintain in a registry).

 

The desire is for the DTN WG to identify changes / augmentations to the SANA registries to provide the information above.  The attached Registry Management Policy deck includes an overview of the Service Site & Aperture structure on slides 21—23.

 

I propose the following strawman for discussion:

 

Change the Network Services under Site Service Info on slide 22 to be a ‘mayInclude (0..*) – i.e. allow for possibly multiple network services.  This would allow sites that have multiple BP routers, which I’ll admit might be unusual but certainly possible.

 

Define a BP_Network_Service element (registry) that is a logical subclass of the Network_Services listed on slide 22 as:

*         CBHE Node #, the CBHE Node Number of the BP Node, hyperlinked to the node number allocation range in the CBHE Node Number Registry

*         POC: a link to the appropriate SANA registry entry for who to talk to about connecting with this node (e.g. routing through it) [Could be a person or an organization?]

*         List of CBHE Service #s: A list of CBHE service numbers that can be expected to be running on the node (e.g. CFDP) – hyperlinked to their corresponding entries in the CBHE Service # registry.

*         List of convergence layers and their information: so for example, if the node is running a TCPCL on IP address 10.1.2.3:1234, a UDP CL on port address 10.1.2.6:5678, and an LTP/Encap CL on virtual channel 3, those would be listed.

o   Maybe listing the VC isn’t appropriate here?  That’s more a function of the mission configuration (e.g. each mission could use a different VC even if all share the same aperture and site, I think)

o   I’d vote for the CL info being a free text field with a convention for entries like TCP:1234:4556 rather than trying to generate a whole sub-structure for CL entries – thoughts?

 

Somebody should probably also define an IP_Network_Service element.  That may fall to us as well but could pretty much mirror the BP one (but without CL info).

 

Thoughts on this?

 

 

                                                v/r,

 

                                                --keith

 

 

Dr. Keith Scott                                                                                                        Office: +1.703.983.6547

Chief Engineer, Communications Network Engineering & Analysis           Fax:      +1.703.983.7142

Advanced Data Transport Capability Area Lead                                             Email:  kscott at mitre.org <mailto:kscott at mitre.org> 

 

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