[CESG] CESG-P-2021-11-004 Approval to publish CCSDS 350.1-G-3, Security Threats against Space Missions (Green Book, Issue 3)
CCSDS Secretariat
thomas.gannett at tgannett.net
Mon Jan 10 15:03:20 UTC 2022
Dear CESG Members,
Conditions for approval of CCSDS 350.1-G-3, Security Threats against
Space Missions (Green Book, Issue 3) have been disposed to the
satisfaction of the AD(s) who voted to approve with conditions. The
Secretariat will now proceed with CMC polling to authorize publication.
-------------- next part --------------
From: Howard.Weiss at parsons.com
Sent: Monday, January 10, 2022 9:12 AM
To: Jonathan W
Cc: Daniel Fischer; CCSDS Secretariat; Shames, Peter M (JPL-312B)[JPL Employee]
Subject: Re: FW: [EXTERNAL] Re: CESG-P-2021-11-004 Approval to publish CCSDS
350.1-G-3, Security Threats against Space Missions (Green Book, Issue 3)
Categories: Poll Condition Closure
Thanks Jonathan. I will make the changes and send an updated version to Tom Gannett.
regards
howie
________________________________
HOWARD WEISS, CISSP
PARSONS Federal
7110 Samuel Morse Drive
Columbia, MD 21046
443-430-8089 (office) / 443-494-9087 (cell) howard.weiss at parsons.com www.parsons.com Please
consider the environment before printing this message
________________________________________
From: Jonathan W <joe.nathan.wilmot at gmail.com>
Sent: Monday, January 10, 2022 8:13 AM
To: Weiss, Howard [US-US]
Cc: Daniel Fischer; CCSDS Secretariat; Shames, Peter M (JPL-312B)[JPL Employee]
Subject: Re: FW: [EXTERNAL] Re: CESG-P-2021-11-004 Approval to publish CCSDS 350.1-G-3, Security
Threats against Space Missions (Green Book, Issue 3)
Howie,
Sorry for the long delay. I am transitioning to NASA Emeritus and it has been moving slowly. My NASA
email should be restored later this week.
I am fine with your updates, so we can consider these conditions closed.
In general, I am trying to get the different CCSDS areas to start considering the impacts to standards
when have crewed systems at lunar distances where everything is not control by ground mission
operators.
In the near term, the Gateway mission is having to consider onboard security and guidance from CCSDS
would be helpful. In particular, they are debating how crew laptops interface to the command and
telemetry systems.
Kind regards,
Jonathan
On 12/30/2021 11:25 AM, Wilmot, Jonathan J. (GSFC-5800) wrote:
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Howard.Weiss at parsons.com <Howard.Weiss at parsons.com>
> Sent: Thursday, December 30, 2021 11:15 AM
> To: Wilmot, Jonathan J. (GSFC-5800) <jonathan.j.wilmot at nasa.gov>
> Cc: Daniel Fischer <Daniel.Fischer at esa.int>; Howard.Weiss at parsons.com;
> CCSDS Secretariat <thomas.gannett at tgannett.net>; Shames, Peter M
> (JPL-312B)[JPL Employee] <peter.m.shames at jpl.nasa.gov>
> Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL] Re: CESG-P-2021-11-004 Approval to publish
> CCSDS 350.1-G-3, Security Threats against Space Missions (Green Book,
> Issue 3)
>
> Hi Jonathan,
>
> I will address your conditions in-line below. See sections with starting with >>>>> (unfortunately I can't
change fonts or colors because the email is text-based).
>
> Happy New Year.
>
> Regards
>
> howie
>
> ----------
>
> HOWARD WEISS, CISSP
> 7110 Samuel Morse Dr, Suite 200
> Columbia, MD 21046
> howard.weiss at parsons.com
> 443-430-8089 (office) / 443-494-9087 (mobile)
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: CCSDS Secretariat <thomas.gannett at tgannett.net>
> Sent: Monday, December 13, 2021 5:16 PM
> To: Weiss, Howard <Howard.Weiss at parsons.com>
> Cc: jonathan.j.wilmot at nasa.gov
> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: CESG-P-2021-11-004 Approval to publish CCSDS
> 350.1-G-3, Security Threats against Space Missions (Green Book, Issue
> 3)
>
> Dear Document Rapporteur,
>
> The CESG poll to approve publication of CCSDS 350.1-G-3, Security Threats against Space Missions
(Green Book, Issue 3) concluded with conditions. Please negotiate disposition of the conditions directly
with the AD(s) who voted to approve with conditions and CC the Secretariat on all related
correspondence.
>
>
> CESG E-Poll Identifier: CESG-P-2021-11-004 Approval to publish CCSDS 350.1-G-3, Security Threats
against Space Missions (Green Book, Issue 3) Results of CESG poll beginning 26 November 2021 and
ending 10 December 2021:
>
> Abstain: 0 (0%) Approve
> Unconditionally: 3 (75%) (Merri, Shames, Aguilar Sanchez) Approve
> with Conditions: 1 (25%) (Wilmot) Disapprove with Comment: 0 (0%)
> CONDITIONS/COMMENTS:
>
> Jonathan Wilmot (Approve with
> Conditions): 3.4.10 UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS should also address crew interfaces which do not
interface through ground systems. An issue to discuss is crew inability to safe themselves when
inappropriate security measures lock them out.
> Consider adding a Tainted Software section similar to 3.4.11 TAINTED HARDWARE COMPONENTS.
Same logic could apply.
>
>>>>> Howard Weiss comments:
> I see your logic for adding a specific space-segment access discussion. However, I don't believe that
recovery by a crew to a lock-out/unauthorized access is in scope of this section. I believe that the
"Description" in 3.4.10 is ok. However, I see that the "Possible Mission Impact" section only discusses
issues with the ground system and nothing directly onboard a spacecraft - mostly because we were not
thinking in terms of a crewed mission. Certainly a crew could go nuts and start smashing buttons
onboard and the likelihood of such a thing happening will go higher in the future with space tourism
growing. But, if something inappropriate occurs to cause an onboard lock-out, the crew should have
*authorization* to do manual corrections. However, those would be *authorized* actions and, in my
opinion, are not relevant to the 3.4.10 discussion on "unauthorized access."
>
> But I propose to add words to include the possibility of a crew person trying to execute unauthorized
action such as: "An access control breach would allow an *unauthorized* entity the ability to take
control of a ground system, ground system network, shut down a ground system, upload unauthorized
commands to a spacecraft, *execute unauthorized commands aboard a crewed mission*, obtain
unauthorized data, contaminate archived data, or completely shut down a mission." I propose to
remove the word *unauthorized* and to add the words between the stars *execute unauthorized
commands aboard a crewed mission*.
>
> Would this be agreeable?
>
> As for adding a section about tainted software akin to tainted hardware, that already exists in section
3.4.9 entitled Software Threats.
>
> Consider adding some discussion on how "Probabilities" were determined
> in treat analysis tables. That would be very useful to the target audience.
> Consider adding some discussion on time distribution. Accurate clocks are key to navigation and
communications protocols such as DTN. Missions have proposed NTP for vehicle to vehicle time
synchronization which brings issues with jumps in time forward/backwards, time convergence latency,
... which could be threats either intended or unintended.
>
>>>>> Howard Weiss comments:
> As it states in the footnotes for each of the tables in Section 5: "These probabilities (in this and all
subsequent tables) are for illustrative purposes only. Mission planners should perform a threat analysis
to determine actual probabilities for specific missions." The probabilities in the tables are a best guess
estimate as determined by the Security WG with no formal, deterministic analysis performed based
solely on Security WG member experience and subject matter expertise and provided for illustration
only.
>
> I agree that time distribution is critical. However it is just one of many critical aspects of a mission that
must rely on *authentication and integrity* mechanisms. It falls in the same category as command
uploads, cryptographic rekey, software upload/manipulation, engineering telemetry, etc. All of these
must be authenticated and not corrupted or all bets are off.
>
>
> Total Respondents: 4
>
> No response was received from the following Area(s):
>
> CSS
> SIS
>
>
>
> SECRETARIAT INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS: Approved with Conditions
> PROPOSED SECRETARIAT ACTION: Generate
> CMC poll after conditions have been addressed
>
> * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
>
>
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