[Cesg-all] Results of CESG Polls closing 21 June 2021

[CCSDS Secretariat]

CESG E-Poll Identifier:  CESG-P-2021-04-002 
Approval to release CCSDS 520.1-P-1.1, Mission 
Operations Reference Model (Pink Book, Issue 1.1) for CCSDS Agency review
Results of CESG poll beginning 19 April 2021 and ending 21 June 2021:

                 Abstain:  1 (25%) (Calzolari)
Approve Unconditionally:  2 (50%) (Merri, Duhaze)
Approve with Conditions:  0 (0%) Disapprove with Comment:  1 (25%) (Shames)

CONDITIONS/COMMENTS:

     Peter Shames (Disapprove with 
Comment):   This update to the MO Reference Model 
appears at a particularly challenging point in 
time.  There are two major issues that must be 
contended with, and neither of them are 
adequately addressed: 1) The SM&C MAL is 
undergoing a major revision, one of which is to 
remove the COM, but that is not addressed; 2) a 
solid security approach, for single systems, but 
most especially for multi-mission systems, is 
essential, but the mechanisms in this document 
remain vague, weak, and poorly articulated.

I have reviewed this document from cover to 
cover.  In addition to these key items I find 
that there are a number of claims that are made 
that do not, upon close reading, appear to be 
supported by the document or the features that 
are in the underlying elements that it attempts 
to describe and depends upon.  These changes are 
far too numerous to attempt to address them in 
any sort of from/to format, so I have embedded 
them in the document in Track Changes form.

I was sufficienly concerned about the secuity 
aspects that I checked with members of the CCSDS 
SEA SecWG.  They fully concurred with my 
assessments, and some of their comments are 
quoted in the body of the text.  Since one of the 
stated desires is to use this framework for 
major, multi-mission, and multi-agency, 
deployments we also looked at it from that point 
of view.  The following comment, quoted from one 
reviewer, should provide further insights:

"I have read all the MO books and followed the 
SM&C WG for ten years now (although its meetings 
always conflict with my own WGs).  When I have a 
hard time figuring out how security fits into MO 
services, a non-CCSDS reader can expect even more difficulty.


JSC gave up active participation in SM&C WG due 
to a perceived lack of ROI for our 
missions.  Compared to the mature operational 
capabilities already implemented for ISS in 
custom software, MO services were viewed as 
redundant.  The single most important features 
deemed lacking, which would have recommended MO 
above a custom implementation, were precisely 
those security capabilities necessary to support 
multiple complex missions across multiple 
agencies/contractors each with their own access 
restriction requirements.  But work on MO 
security services has been deferred indefinitely 
by the SM&C WG (and reading the MO 2.0 list of 
topics, appears to be absent yet again).


2-3 years ago, ESA’s ground segment team proposed 
migrating to the use of MO services for 
ISS/Gateway/etc. as a bridging service between 
partner control centers.  At the time I put in 
some good words for deploying a prototype.  But 
MO security cannot remain an unknown quantity if 
JSC is ever to recommend spending the resources 
to develop and validate an operational implementation."


Another point to be made, in the context of CCSDS 
"reference model" Magenta Books is that MB are 
intended to be normative content.  This permits 
them to not be "directly implementable", but it 
also requires that they "provide normative, 
controlling, guidance rather than purely 
descriptive material."  While the word 
"normative" is used a lot, and there is liberal 
use made of UML diagrams, which give the 
appearance of concrete recommendations, on closer 
examination all of the figures are abstractions 
and there are really no concrete examples to 
reference and tie these abstractions to 
reality.  At almost every turn these very real 
concrete concerns are just dismissed as 
"implementation" or "deployment" details.  This 
makes the document vague and does not provide 
concrete examples to substantiate that the stated 
claims can be achieved.  This is especially true 
of the security sections, but it is also true 
throughout, particularly where multi-mission deployments are considered.

It would be in the best interests of CCSDS and 
the SM&C WG if these security and Magenta Book 
content issues were directly addressed now, along 
with the other issues already identified in WG 
discussions.  Given these obvious flaws, it makes 
no sense to publish this document now, especially 
in the current challenging security and mission climate.


Total Respondents:  4

No response was received from the following Area(s):

     CSS
     SOIS
     SIS



SECRETARIAT INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS:  Disapproved
PROPOSED SECRETARIAT ACTION:            No Action

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CESG E-Poll Identifier:  CESG-P-2021-05-001 
Approval to publish CCSDS 230.1-G-3, TC 
Synchronization and Channel Coding—Summary of 
Concept and Rationale (Green Book, Issue 3)
Results of CESG poll beginning 26 May 2021 and ending 21 June 2021:

                 Abstain:  1 (12.5%) (Merri)
Approve Unconditionally:  6 (75%) (Barkley, 
Duhaze, Burleigh, Cola, Calzolari, Moury)
Approve with Conditions:  1 (12.5%) (Shames)
Disapprove with Comment:  0 (0%)
Total Respondents:  8

No response was received from the following Area(s):

     SOIS



SECRETARIAT INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS:  Approved with Conditions
PROPOSED SECRETARIAT ACTION:            Generate 
CMC poll after conditions have been addressed

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